

## JACQUES DERRIDA'S *DOUBLE* DECONSTRUCTIVE READING: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS?

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The present essay constitutes a critical appraisal of Derrida's deconstructive *double* reading. This appraisal highlights a certain tension between the two different "gestures" that comprise deconstructive reading: namely, between the *first* reading (a reading that reproduces or "doubles" authorial or textual intention) and the *second* reading (a reading that deconstructs the meanings that have been determined and identified during the *first* reading). Derrida's general position is that in the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for meaning, all textual meaning "is exceeded or split by the intervention of writing, that is, by a *dissemination* irreducible to *polysemy*." Yet, while such a position renders possible the deconstruction of semantically determinate and identifiable claims (during the *second* reading), it renders impossible the attainment of such claims (during the *first* reading).

### I

*Deconstructive Reading as a Double Reading.* In *Of Grammatology*, in the chapter entitled "The Exorbitant. Question of Method", Derrida notes that deconstructive reading situates itself in the gap between what the author "commands" within her text (her "*vouloir-dire*") and what she does not "command", that is, what takes place in her text without her will. This distance, fissure or opening is something that deconstructive reading must "produce" (OG 158/DLG 227).<sup>1</sup>

Yet, in order to produce this fissure or opening, deconstructive reading must first reproduce what the author "wants-to-say", something that requires the submission to classical reproductive reading practices. The *traditional* reading (namely the reproduction of the authorial or textual intention) is then *destabilised* through the utilisation of all those elements that have refused to be incorporated within it. Hence, the meanings produced during this *first* reading become "disseminated" during the *second* reading. In other words, during this second reading the text loses its initial apparent semantic determinacy, organized around the axis of its authorial intention, and is eventually pushed into producing a number of incompatible meanings which are "undecidable", in the sense that the reader lacks any secure ground for choosing between them. For example, in *Plato's Pharmacy*,<sup>2</sup> Derrida exhibits the way in which the text of *Phaedrus*, despite Plato's intention to keep the two opposite meanings of *pharmakon* – namely the meanings of "remedy" and "poison" – separate, ends up affirming *à la fois* both.

A deconstructive reading, therefore, contains both a “dominant”,<sup>3</sup> reproductive reading and a “critical”, productive reading. The *first* reading, which Derrida calls a “doubling commentary” [*commentaire redoublant*] (OG 158/DLG 227), finds a passage “*lisible*” and understandable, and reconstructs the *determinate* meaning of the passage read according to a procedure that the deconstructive reader shares with common readers. The *second* reading, which he calls a “critical reading” or an “active interpretation”, goes on to *disseminate* the meanings that the *first* reading has already construed. In this double reading or “double gesture” [*double geste*],<sup>4</sup> Derrida is obliged to use classical interpretative norms and practices and, at the same time, to negate their power to “control” a text, to construe thoroughly a text as something *determinate*, and to “disseminate” the text into a series of “undecidable” meanings.

The tension in Derrida’s “double” interpretive procedure is rather apparent. Deconstruction can only subvert the meaning of a text that has already been construed. In order for a text’s *intentional* meaning to become destabilised, the text needs to possess a certain stability so that it can be rendered *determinate*. In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida describes this “doubling commentary” – the initial determination or reading that the deconstructive operation focuses on – as

the “minimal” deciphering of the “first” pertinent or competent access to structures that are *relatively stable (and hence destabilizable!)*, and from which the most venturesome questions and interpretations have to start...” [italics added] (“Afterword” 145/“Postface” 268)

The expression “*relatively stable (and hence destabilizable!)*”, mirrors the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructive criticism: the determination of the metaphysical text has to be *stable* since the destabilising force of deconstruction can take place only on something that possesses a certain stability whilst simultaneously being *unstable* in order for deconstruction to be possible.

Initially, Derrida seems to be justified in arguing that a certain structure, though stable, is potentially destabilisable: “A stability is not an immutability” (“Afterword” 151/“Postface” 279). Change is an ineliminable, never-ending possibility. Yet, Derrida invokes those reasons for the destabilization of a certain textual structure which would preclude any (even “relative”) stability to it. Therefore, the question that arises is whether it is possible to think together the possibility of stable determinations and meaning as “dissemination” in a non-contradictory manner?

But how does Derrida justify the possibility of the “relative stable” structure of the “doubling commentary”? For him, the analysis of the constitution of meaning undertaken in the first part of *Of Grammatology*, and condensed in the statement that “[t]he absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely”,<sup>5</sup> does not

constitute an obstacle to the existence of relative stable or determinate meanings. On the contrary, *différance* – a neologism which Derrida coins in order to underline the fact that meaning is the product of the endless differential play of language – is not presented as a constitutive “indeterminacy” but rather as “render[ing] determination both possible and necessary” (“Afterword” 149/“Postface” 275). *Différance* is the playful movement which produces the differences that are constitutive for words and conceptualisation in general: “Différance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other” (P 27/POS 38).<sup>6</sup>

Derrida’s *différance* constitutes the radicalization of Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics and, in particular, of the determination of the sign as *arbitrary* and *differential*. For Saussure, a linguistic sign “connects not a thing with a name but an idea with an acoustic image”<sup>7</sup> or, respectively, a “signified” (*signifié*) with a “signifier” (*signifiant*). In this sense, the constitutive elements of the linguistic sign are not physical but mental. The bond between the *signifier* and the *signified*, Saussure tells us, is not natural, but instituted or conventional. So, signs are “arbitrary” within the given system of language and have meaning only within this system. The signs of language are not autonomous ideas and sounds which exist independently of the linguistic system. These ideas and sounds are simply elements of a linguistic system, and have the status of conceptual and phonic differences produced from within this system itself. A sign has meaning through the position which it occupies within a chain of conceptual and phonetic differences. As Saussure declares: “In a language, there are only differences” (CLG 166). These differences are not differences between positive terms, namely between already formed acoustic images or ideas: “in language there are only differences *without positive terms*” (CGL 166). In that respect, language is not a system of identities but a systematic structure of differences.

Derrida infers from Saussure’s position on the arbitrary and differential character of the sign that it is impossible “that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself” (P 26/POS 37). Signs do not reflect pre-existing objectivities or meanings. The possibility of any signification is dependent on a silent system of differential references. In this sense, in order for any present element to signify it must refer to another element, different from itself, that is not present. Derrida views meaning as a process of signification which functions according to this pattern and, thus, that the idea of the capacity to grasp the essence or the meaning of a sign – a true presence – is an illusion.

Since the signified is never present in its full plenitude, the structure of the sign is always already simultaneously marked by difference and non-

presence. Derrida coins the neologism "*différance*" to describe the difference, or the being-different of these differences, the "production" as well as the "contamination" of each present element by something which is not present. The substitution of the "e" of "*différence*" by the "a" of "*différance*" from the present participle "*différente*", recalls the French verb *différer*. The verb *différer* has two seemingly quite distinct meanings which are drawn from the Latin verb *differere*. The double meaning of the French *différer* is rendered in English by the different verbs "to differ" and "to defer". Hence, *différer*, in the sense of the verb "to differ", signifies difference as lack of resemblance between two things, distinction, lack of identity, dissimilarity, or discernibility, while, *différer*, in the sense of the verb "to defer", signifies "the interposition of delay, the interval of a spacing and temporilizing that puts off until 'later' what is presently denied, the possible that is presently impossible".<sup>8</sup>

Hence, *différance*, for Derrida, does not constitute an obstacle that would prevent someone from making *relatively stable* determinations regarding a text's meaning. In fact, *différance*, we are told, is the condition of possibility and impossibility of meaning: while it makes meaning present, it excludes it from being *absolutely* present. Hence, the non-identity of meaning with itself, this *différance*, has not the *slightest* effect on the establishment of a text's intentional meaning, as Derrida often argues emphatically in opposition to all those who, he thinks, are misinterpreting him when characterising deconstruction as "hermeneutic terrorism" (e.g. John Ellis)<sup>9</sup>: "this process of intentions and meaning differing from themselves does not negate the possibility of 'doubling commentary'" ("Afterword" 147/"Postface").

In this sense, deconstruction's "doubling commentary" does not differ radically from other traditional reconstructions of a text's authorial intentions. As Derrida himself confesses: "And you are right in saying that these 'practical implications for interpretation' are 'not so threatening to conventional modes of reading'" ("Afterword" 147/"Postface" 271). All those readers, who would "hastily" conclude that the radical view of language and meaning put forward in the first part of *Of Grammatology*<sup>10</sup> fundamentally overturns all our traditional notions of interpretation and reading, would find themselves filled with surprise when in the second part, in the section entitled "The Exorbitant. Question of Method", they are suddenly prompted to "respect all the classical exigencies" and "all the instruments of traditional criticism." (OG 158/DLG 227)

In the same spirit, in "Afterword: Towards an Ethics of Discussion", Derrida cautions against reading "undecidability" as equivalent to "indeterminacy":

I do not believe I have ever spoken of "indeterminacy," whether in regard to 'meaning' or anything else. Undecidability is something else again... undecidability is always a

*determinate* oscillation between possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly *determined* in strictly *defined* situations (for example, discursive – syntactical or rhetorical – but also political, ethical, etc.). They are *pragmatically* determined. The analyses that I have devoted to undecidability concern just these determinations and these definitions, not at all some vague “indeterminacy.” ...Which is to say that from the point of view of semantics, but also of ethics and politics, ‘deconstruction’ should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism.

To be sure, in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures of decisions and of responsibilities as well), there must be a certain play, *différance*, nonidentity. Not of indetermination, but of *différance* or of nonidentity with oneself in the very process of determination. *Différance* is not indeterminacy. It renders determinacy both possible and necessary. (“Afterword” 148-9/“Postface” 273-4)

Hence, Derrida does not seem to question the attribution of “relatively stable” meanings to words and, by extension, to texts themselves. This is what allows Derrida to be able to *decide*, for example, whenever Plato uses the equivocal word *pharmakon* whether he means *either* “remedy” or “poison”. The “essential” or “undecidable” equivocality of the word *pharmakon* is of another nature. It lies in the text’s refusal to decide, against its author’s intentions, in favour of the identification of the word with one of its two opposite meanings (thus the *pharmakon* is described as “undecidable”). The text does not refuse to *determine* different meanings for the word *pharmakon*; it refuses to *decide* in favour of the one or the other.

Yet, if *différance* “is not indeterminacy”, if it “renders determinacy both possible and necessary” thereby allowing a text to possess a “relative stability”, then what is it that renders the *deconstruction* of these “relatively stable” determinations possible? The answer is again: *Différance*. All those elements previously described as intervening in the production of meaning – play, difference, *différance* – are also invoked to justify the deconstruction of that “effect” of meaning which the differential play itself has produced. In order to justify the possibility of a text’s deconstruction, Derrida turns to the turbulent effects of *différance*, which, however, were previously declared as not constituting an obstacle to the attainment of those stable textual determinations which are now subject to deconstruction. The differential play, by preventing a concept’s meaning to be “fully *present* (present to itself, to its signified, to the other)” (OG 8/DLG 17), is now posed as that which pushes the concepts (see, for example, the concept *pharmakon*) – and by extension the text in its entirety – into “undecidability”. The same “play”, which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively stable meaning. If, as Simon Glendinning writes, “the necessity of ‘play’ ensures that any putative ‘unity of meaning’ is *a priori* ‘dispersed’ in advance”,<sup>11</sup> then which stability of meaning, even relative, is it possible to begin from? If the term “dissemination”<sup>12</sup> is another name for the “play”, which, for Derrida characterises *all* conceptual identities, then, the stability

of meaning that the “doubling commentary” requires seems to have its possibility undermined.

Derrida falls into a paradox when he presents this “play” or *différance*, – the constant slipping of entities and their passage into their opposites as a perpetual reversal of properties – as limited only to “a *determinate* oscillation between...highly *determined* possibilities”, without having any prior effect on the process of the *determination* of these possibilities. If there is a certain “*play or relative indetermination*” (“Afterword” 144/“Postface” 266) in the process of determination, as he himself declares, how then is determination possible in the form required by the “doubling commentary”?

Derrida interprets the effects of the differential constitution of concepts *at will*. To the extent that deconstruction needs the “doubling commentary”, the constitution of a sign’s meaning or identity through its differences from other signs does not prevent signs or concepts from carrying with them, at the level of their use, a certain, “relatively stable” load of meaning (something that, according to Derrida, allows the existence of stable determinations of a text’s *vouloir-dire*, as that of his “doubling commentary”). On the other hand, when Derrida needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this “doubling commentary” is made possible, he invokes a certain “*play or relative indetermination* that was able to open the space of my interpretation, for example, that of the word *supplément*” [italics added] (“Afterword” 144/“Postface” 266).<sup>13</sup> Thus, Derrida seems to “remain blind” to the consequences of the existence of this “play or relative indetermination” in relation to the possibility of “doubling commentary” itself. The “hesitation” that Derrida exhibits in regard to the exact role that “indeterminacy” plays within deconstructive reading – a hesitation imposed by the very prerequisites of deconstructive double reading – forces him into contradictory statements such as when, on the one hand, he explicitly refers to a certain “play or indetermination” in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction, while on the other hand, he claims that “I do not believe I have ever spoken of ‘indeterminacy’, whether in regard to ‘meaning’ or anything else...*Différance* is not indeterminacy” (“Afterword” 148/“Postface” 273). Yet, in a third passage Derrida declares again that “[o]nce again, that was possible only if a non-self-identity, a *différance* and a *relative indeterminacy* opened the space of this violent history” (italics added) (“Afterword” 145/“Postface” 267). Thus, due to the paradoxical presuppositions of deconstructive reading, all Derrida’s descriptions will have to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the attainment of stable determinations and the possibility of their dissemination.

## II

*Interpreting Authorial Intention.* In contradiction with what he says about the endless play between concepts, the fissure that *différance* effects on the

core of presence, the sign which is just a "trace", the "residue" of meaning which is just meaning falling short of itself or the *dispersal* of meaning in general, Derrida treats authorial or textual intention (a text's *vouloir-dire*) as something which can be determined *univocally*. And this seems to flow from the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself. Deconstruction is installed between a text's intended meaning (its *declarative* layer) and the text itself (its *descriptive* layer). If a text's authorial intention was not fixed and univocal, then it would be difficult for deconstruction to juxtapose against it contradictory elements found in the same text.<sup>14</sup> Thus, contrary to the text as a whole, which Derrida treats as heterogeneous and equivocal, authorial or textual intention is presented as always possessing coherence,<sup>15</sup> homogeneity, and as being characterised by lack of ambiguity. Moreover, Derrida treats the text, during its *first* reading, as if only *one* interpretation of authorial intention were possible. He never examines the possibility, (without being theoretically able to preclude such a possibility), that other interpretations of authorial intention are also possible. The aim of this is to protect the effectiveness of the strategy of deconstruction. If Derrida accepted, even potentially, that other interpretations of a text's *vouloir-dire* were possible, then he could not preclude the possibility that other, non-metaphysical determinations of a text's intentional meaning could be feasible, determinations that would not thus be in dire need of deconstruction. This, in turn, would affect his whole "narrative" about "Western metaphysics," which is animated by the spirit of an *unequivocal* interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition, thereby depriving it of much of its credibility. Moreover, if he conceded the possibility of the existence of other plausible interpretations, either metaphysical or not (although this is something that he could not know in advance), then the deconstruction of merely *one* interpretation out of this potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited significance and effectiveness.

The kind of certainty about a text's *vouloir-dire* that deconstruction requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure, solid, "self-identical" facts which can be used to anchor the work. However, this way of conceiving meaning is in direct opposition to deconstruction, for which meaning is impossible to determine in terms of a fixed entity or substance. An author's intention is itself a complex 'text', which can be debated, translated and variously interpreted just like any other text ("Afterword" 143/"Postface" 265).

Derrida, for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts, seems paradoxically to share the prejudgement that philosophical texts, at least if *only* at an initial level, are integrated wholes, as if the unity of the work resides in the author's all-pervasive intention. However, there is, in fact, no reason why the author should not have had several mutually contradictory

intentions, or why her intention may not have been somehow self-contradictory. This is actually a possibility that Derrida does not consider at all. The way in which authorial intentions appear in texts does not necessarily form a consistent whole, and it may be unwise to rest upon this assumption too heavily, particularly, if one speaks, as Derrida does, about intention as "only an effect." There is absolutely no need to suppose that authorial or textual intention either do or should constitute harmonious wholes.

In this sense, Derrida's stance towards a text's authorial intention (i.e. its *vouloir-dire*) could be described as juridical: anything which cannot be herded inside the enclosure of 'probable' authorial meaning is brusquely expelled, and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly subordinated to this single governing intention. Under such an approach, authorial "indeterminacies" are abolished, in order to be replaced with a stable meaning. They must be "normalised". Such a "doubling commentary" of authorial or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the greatest number of a work's elements. Hence, it would not be "exorbitant" to attribute to Derrida, in his treatment of authorial or textual intention, the same accusations he attributes to the metaphysical tradition concerning the way in which it treats texts as unified wholes.

### III

*Conclusion.* Derrida could have limited himself to the less ambitious (and also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles or containers of *absolutely* present meanings. Of course, he would not be the first philosopher to make such a claim. Moreover, such a claim would not necessarily exclude the possibility of the existence of "relatively stable" meanings; it would exclude only the existence of perfectly *univocal* meanings.<sup>16</sup> Yet Derrida is not content with merely doubting univocity. He wants to do something bigger: to deconstruct. He thus takes the further step of arguing that in the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our linguistic practices the "dissemination" of construed meanings into "undecidability" is endless. Now the possibility of deconstruction arises, but a certain anomaly in its "double" interpretive procedure seems to arise too: a text must be read *determinately* in order to be disseminated into an "undecidability" that never breaks completely free of its initial determination. Deconstruction can only subvert the meanings of a text that has already been construed *determinately*. So, what does deconstruction ultimately favour: *determination* or *dissemination*? Derrida needs to decide<sup>17</sup> whether *différance* promotes stability in meaning (even a relative one) or "dissemination." He cannot utilise *both* possibilities simply because deconstruction needs them both.<sup>18</sup>

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## References

1. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976 (OG) / *De la Grammatologie*, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967), (DLG).
2. Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy" in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981) (D) "Le Pharmacie de Platon" in *La Dissemination*, Collection "Essais", (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1972) (DIS).
3. Derrida calls this initial reading that deconstruction enacts on the text "dominant interpretation" ("interprétation dominant") [J. Derrida, "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" in *Limited Inc*, trans. S. Weber, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. 143 ("Afterword") / "Postface: Vers une éthique de discussion" in *Limited Inc*, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), p. 265 ("Postface")].
4. Jacques Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context" in *Limited Inc*, op.cit., p.21 / "Signature Événement Contexte" in *Marges de la philosophie*, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), p. 392.
5. Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences" in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 280 / "La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours de sciences humains" in *Ecriture et Différence*, (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1967), p. 411.
6. Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass, (London: The Athlone Press, 1987) (P) / *Positions*, (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972) (POS).
7. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, (Paris: Payot, 1973), p. 98 (CLG).
8. Jacques Derrida, "Différance" in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1982), p. 3 / "La différance" in *Marges de la philosophie*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972, p. 3.
9. John M. Ellis, *Against Deconstruction*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 134.
10. The first part of *Of Grammatology* is presented by Derrida as a "theoretical matrix", while the second part (i.e. Derrida's deconstructive reading of Rousseau's *Essay* and the *Confessions*) is presented as an "example" of the first part:  
"The first part of this book, 'Writing before the Letter,' sketches in broad outlines a theoretical matrix. It indicates certain significant historical moments, and proposes certain critical concepts. These critical concepts are put to the test in the second part, 'Nature, Culture, Writing.' This is the moment, as it were, of the example, although strictly speaking, that notion is not acceptable within my argument." (OG lxxxix/DLG 7)
11. Simon Glendinning, *On Being with Others: Heidegger-Derrida-Wittgenstein*, (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 81.
12. Explaining the term "dissemination", Gayatri Chacravorty Spivak mentions the following:  
"Exploiting a false etymological kinship between semantics and semen, Derrida offers this version of textuality: A sowing that does not produce plants, but is simply infinitely repeated. A semination that is not insemination but dissemination, seed spilled in vain... Not an exact and controlled polysemy, but a proliferation of always different, always postponed meanings." (G. S. Spivak, "Translator's Preface", in Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, o.p., lxxv). While Richard Harland adds: "*Dissemination* must be distinguished from *univocity* or the state of single meanings maintained by the signified in the writer's mind; but it must also be distinguished from *polysemy* or the state of multiple meanings maintained by the signified in the reader's mind. *Dissemination* is the state of perpetually unfulfilled meaning that exists in the absence of all signifieds." (Richard Harland, *Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of Structuralism & Post-Structuralism*, New York: Methuen, 1987, p. 135).
13. In the next page of the "Afterword: Towards an Ethics of Discussion", explicating the possibility of the deconstruction of "doubling commentary" Derrida refers once more to a "relative indeterminacy" within determination as a prerequisite for the possibility of any

deconstruction: "[o]nce again, that was possible only if a non-self-identity, a *différance* and a *relative indeterminacy* opened the space of this violent history" (italics added) ("Afterword" 145/"Postface" 267).

14. In the "Afterword", Derrida declares in consistency with what he thinks about language and meaning that "'doubling commentary' is not a moment of simple reflexive recording that would transcribe the originary and true layer of a text's *intentional meaning*, a meaning that is *univocal* and self-identical" (italics added) ("Afterword" 143/"Postface" 265). However, in practice, Derrida treats the "doubling" of a text's authorial intention according to those terms that he denounces above. Indicative of this attitude is the fact that from his multiple readings, hesitation is completely absent.
15. For example, in "Violence and Metaphysics", Derrida declares that "[w]e will refuse to sacrifice the self-coherent unity of intention [*l'unité fidèle à soi de l'intention*] to the becoming which then would be no more than pure disorder." (J. Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics" in *Writing and Difference*, o.p., p. 84).
16. This position would be also content with a certain conception of *différance*: while *différance* makes meaning present, it excludes it from being *absolutely* present.
17. In "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", when he refers to two different "interpretations of interpretation", the structuralist deciphering of a meaning and the Nietzschean affirmation of play, which can be compared respectively with the two different kinds of interpretation that comprise deconstructive "double" reading itself, Derrida declares that "I do not believe that today there is any question of *choosing* – in the first place because here we are in a region (let us say, provisionally, a region of historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly trivial" (J. Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and....", *Writing and Difference*, op.cit., p. 293). Even if it is accepted that this declaration does not constitute an attempt to escape from an adequate justification of the paradoxical demands of deconstructive reading, what are the interpretive resources that Derrida has utilised in order to reach such an assertion about the kinds of interpretation prevailing today as well as today's situation regarding choice? Is such an assertion made from *either* the side of deciphering *or* playful interpretation? Does not such an assertion violate what Derrida says about choice?
18. I would like to thank Dr Peter Langford for his invaluable help.